A Brief Journey into the Land of Misconception
Two Primary Reasons for Israel's Failure Against Hamas
This guest post by
and was originally published on Weissword Substack.While this post rightfully points out the negligence of Netanyahu and successive administrations, it is still necessary to say that the hatred of Jews and Israel is endemic in the surrounding countries. Arrogance played a role in what happened in 2023, but the Arab hatred is ideological. Religion will forever drive their lust for vengeance and wiping the ‘Zionists’ off the face of the Earth.
This long post may be a tough read for some die-hard Netanyahu fans, but the events on that fateful day raise some serious questions.
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A Brief Journey into the Land of Misconception
"Hamas leaders want to be martyrs, and they do not fear death. Jihad and resistance will continue until victory, and we will all be martyrs." - Ahmed Yassin
Hamas launched a brilliantly planned, daring, and professional attack on the morning of October 7, 2023. With excellent intelligence and advanced technological tools, they managed to stun the Israeli military for many hours. Israel's southwestern border remained breached, allowing for a mass invasion from the Gaza Strip without any significant defensive military force. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that several hours after the initial attack, Gaza residents—not combatants—invaded western Negev settlements without fear, kidnapped civilians, and committed crimes against humanity.
Hamas fighters controlled vast areas, penetrated numerous settlements and military bases, and dominated dirt roads and major highways. Additionally, they moved toward carefully selected targets such as strategic facilities and major cities in the coastal plain. Only the courage of Israeli citizens and soldiers serving on the border, who defended with their bodies against thousands of terrorists, prevented an even greater catastrophe.
The attack on Israel did not suddenly appear out of nowhere... it was the product of a long-standing policy in which Israeli governments injected billions of shekels into Hamas through trade and tax collection, encouraged Israeli exports of equipment on a massive scale that was used to build numerous weapons and dig the world's largest tunnel city, and laundered money for Hamas through Israeli banks. Israel built Hamas's strength and ignored all warning signs over the years. Furthermore, successive governments failed to hold strategic meetings with military, economic, and diplomatic plans regarding the Gaza Strip.
Israeli leaders dismissed Hamas's totalitarian ideology and believed it could be exchanged for economic peace.
In 2014, the Israeli edition of Forbes magazine published an article on the world's richest terrorist organizations, listing Hamas as one of the 10 wealthiest. Eyal Ofer, who has followed events in Gaza for years, stated: "Hamas manages to get its hands on 10-15% of Gaza's total economic activity, valued at more than $3 billion, generating about half a billion dollars annually." In 2022, the magazine reported that Hamas was the fifth richest terrorist organization in the world. Many believe it was the suitcases of cash from Qatar, but the majority of Hamas's economic wealth came from trade with Israel through tax collection. The cash suitcases were meant to pay smugglers in cash across the Egyptian border for cigarettes, drugs, women, weapons, and more.
Despite withdrawing from Gaza in 2005, Israel embedded and ingrained assumptions and perceptions that became entrenched in the security establishment and governments—that it was preferable to be the provider of water, electricity, trade, and funds to Gaza because this would allow control over the "switch" against the Gaza government in case of military tension. This conception was formulated during Ehud Barak's tenure as Defense Minister in Olmert's government in 2008, after Hamas's rise to power in Gaza in 2007, when he supported transferring funds to Hamas.
In 2010, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said about Defense Minister Ehud Barak: "During Operation Cast Lead, Barak did everything to protect Hamas and not complete the operation—all while carrying out subversive actions against me and the government." His former cabinet member, Haim Ramon, has long accused Ehud Barak of introducing the concept of "economic peace" and agreements with Hamas despite the numerous terrorist acts suffered by residents of the western Negev.
Ehud Barak also served as Defense Minister in Netanyahu's government for about four years, during which trade with Hamas escalated despite the military actions he took, such as the massive construction of tunnels near Israeli settlements that were later used for infiltration and attacks. In 2012, Barak announced his retirement from political life, and Likud member Moshe Ya'alon took over as Defense Minister. Although Barak left his position, the Israeli political system, and to some extent the security establishment, did not challenge the concept of "economic peace." One of Israel's main problems is the components of superficial culture, arrogance, and discussions that are primarily displays of declarations. This has been the case since the state's establishment and is not a problem of one government or another but of all Israeli governments.
In 2014, Hamas launched a massive attack against Israeli settlements following increased military activity against Hamas after three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered. Israel was surprised by the scale of the fighting launched against it by Hamas in the air, sea, and land. Hamas fighters infiltrated military bases and Israeli territory through tunnels built over years—tunnels that were known to security agencies but which they chose not to act against, including elements within the government itself. Nearly 5,000 rockets were fired at Israeli settlements, and Israeli soldiers became entangled in fighting in neighborhoods in northern Gaza. The political echelon feared significant damage in Gaza and ordered Israeli forces to withdraw despite the continued fighting against Hamas. The bodies of soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul were kidnapped. However, despite being attacked and its soldiers' bodies being held as bargaining chips, Israel did not stop trade with Hamas nor use this as leverage for the return of the soldiers' bodies.
In 2017, Prime Minister Netanyahu testified before the State Control Committee in the Knesset regarding Operation Protective Edge and the enormous failures exposed, stating:
"Intelligence indicates that Hamas prepared itself for a large-scale operation aimed at removing the naval blockade as a result of various moves it sought to advance. The operational plan was a combined multi-pronged attack—air attacks with thousands of missiles on Israeli cities, sea attacks with hundreds of naval commando raids, air attacks with paragliders, and land infiltration through dozens of tunneled tunnels, with forces of up to battalion size to kidnap and kill in settlements and areas."
In effect, Netanyahu foresaw the terrible and tragic attack that Hamas would carry out on Saturday morning in October 2023. Netanyahu did not need to be awakened to be warned about Hamas's readiness for an attack. It was known to him years earlier. How did he act as Prime Minister, and what strategy did he formulate? What did he do during all those years regarding Hamas's military buildup? Why was Israel left without ammunition, skilled manpower, and equipment after two days of fighting, and most importantly, why did he know or not know about the number of forces on the Gaza border given the nightmare scenario he spoke about in 2017? If he believed in 2017 that Hamas's plans were terrible and horrific, why did he continue to approve trade with Hamas and encourage the flow of vast equipment and capital to the terrorist organization? These questions and many others from which he cannot escape. By the way, the Defense Ministers who were there and other Prime Ministers will not be able to escape answering these and other issues. Did Prime Minister Bennett act differently? Did Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman? Without a state commission of inquiry, Israel will not be able to fill the gaps regarding the nature and desired way to correct its path, and a crisis like the one that developed in October may recur more quickly.
Israel was very surprised by Hamas's determination to fight against it in 2014, yet the political echelon in the government did not understand the event it faced. Cabinet discussions were published on the YNET website, and it was Minister Naftali Bennett who pushed, pressured, and acted against the defense establishment, the Chief of Staff, and the Defense Minister regarding Hamas tunnels that turned out to be a significant strategic danger. The transcripts are hair-raising.
"There are dozens of tunnels in Gaza designed for kidnapping; they're not there to rust," he continues and stings Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon, in a paraphrase of his statement before the Second Lebanon War that Hezbollah's rockets would rust in warehouses. "We need to take proactive action at the contact line."
Bennett: "I recommend acting to neutralize the tunnels." Ya'alon: "And if you achieve quiet for three years without destroying the tunnels, what's wrong with that?" Bennett: "And if we suffer a strategic attack, it will be a Gilad Shalit event times 100. It's better for us to prevent it in advance, and I haven't seen a plan on how to prevent it." Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said in an interview with "Israel Hayom" newspaper: "Gantz came to the meeting, scared the entire cabinet, and warned of this option of conquering Gaza and defeating Hamas. He presented a presentation claiming there would be 500 soldiers killed, and many hundreds more wounded. He explicitly said he opposed such an operation and claimed it wasn't worth the price."
These harsh words expressed the ministers' distress due to the emergency situation. The government was not prepared for war, and its ministers did not even know about the dangers that Hamas had built. The State Comptroller's report on Operation Protective Edge highlighted the failures of Netanyahu's government, such as the absence and non-convening of political-security cabinet meetings for nearly a year, the concealment of critical intelligence information from ministers, the absence of a strategy against Gaza, and especially the significant lack of preparedness of the army against the tunnel threat that was known to the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, the National Security Council head, and the Shin Bet. This is what was written in the State Comptroller's report:
"...in the period until Operation 'Protective Edge,' cabinet ministers did not receive background material before cabinet discussions, on the grounds that these were classified materials. All ministers of the 33rd Cabinet, except for the former Defense Minister, claimed to the audit team that they lacked background material before discussions in the cabinet, and thus did not arrive sufficiently prepared for discussions."
The criticism continues and expands that the political-security cabinet did not convene for nearly a year and did not deal with strategic threats facing Israel. How can the government decide and formulate any policy if the cabinet is not convened? How can security forces prepare if the government does not tell them what to do? Because the ministers did not have comprehensive and deep information, it was the army that set the objectives for the government—a reversed world—and government members had to align with the army's policy.
"From the establishment of the 33rd government's cabinet and for about a year—until March 23, 2014, no discussions were held in the cabinet to determine strategic objectives regarding Gaza. The operational plans for the Gaza Strip were presented to cabinet ministers before the cabinet set strategic objectives for the Gaza Strip. As a result, the military echelon was forced to outline strategic objectives itself, in order to plan military activity accordingly."
Did Israel learn anything from the 2014 war? Not at all, but Hamas learned and grew much stronger. In repeated attempts such as mass demonstrations near the fence, Hamas recorded and studied Israel's intelligence, surveillance, and monitoring systems. The mass demonstrations served as excellent camouflage so that Hamas could analyze the smart system fence built against the Gaza Strip. The army would be busy with the demonstrations, and Hamas would remotely photograph, document, and investigate the army's systems on the border fence. Additionally, through espionage in military bases, Hamas received intelligence on the plans of every vital structure. Hamas obtained the private names of military security coordinators, their residences, and phone numbers, and marked them as targets during the invasion of Israel. For example, during the invasion of Netiv HaAsara, the terrorists' meeting point was set in advance at the home of the former security coordinator of the settlement, Gil Taasa, who was murdered after protecting his children and jumping on a hand grenade during the attack. The terrorist killed the father and then went to the family refrigerator and drank Coca-Cola with pleasure.

If we move forward from 2014, the most severe warning sign appeared at the end of the coronavirus crisis, during a period when the Israeli army suspended training for soldiers in regular service and reserves, the intelligence corps tracked viruses and developed unfounded theories about their spread despite the fact that enemies around Israel never stopped training for war against it. Attention was directed to an invented array regarding viruses, instead of Israel's borders. Military correspondent Alon Ben David expressed this well:
"It took Hezbollah 48 hours to implement a mirror response to an action attributed to Israel. After sunset on Saturday night, three teams of the organization advanced on hidden paths toward the border and created three breaches in the fence: in the Metula, Yiftach, and Avivim areas... Meanwhile, many of the research officers of Military Intelligence are busy analyzing infection centers of the disease, special operations personnel are chasing tests, and the Mossad chief has moved his residence to Sheba Medical Center and is fighting the virus. When we sober up from the pandemic panic—these people need to return and deal with what is the most significant and real threat to Israel. Twenty years ago, we hoped to leave it behind, but Lebanon is still at our doorstep."
Against the background of Israel's military and political unpreparedness, Hamas decided to create a security crisis that was essentially a trial run or, if you will, a dress rehearsal for the major attack. In Israel, the crisis developed and was named Operation Guardian of the Walls. Knesset member Zvika Hauser, in his role as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, warned and said:
"I very much hope that in this year and these days, when there is no defense budget, we are not writing the introductory chapters of a commission of inquiry for the next war. When they come and ask about its results, they will go back to that period when there was no updated defense budget. I again call on the political echelon to come to its senses, because here it really is about life and death; here it is about negligence or turning a blind eye on an issue that is in our blood."
"Unfortunately, there are no political-security cabinet meetings to the extent required in light of the challenges facing us, in the sequence and times when the cabinet needs to convene. Here too, I allow myself to warn in these concluding words, about the implications of not holding vital and critical discussions in the political-security cabinet. As I said, the discussions held in this committee were a kind of alternative, but this is not an adequate alternative."
In May 2021, Israel was surprised again. The army was not prepared. Security and intelligence forces did not function. A huge failure that initially led to Arab unrest in mixed cities in Israel with Jewish and Arab populations, with damage through pogroms in Jewish communities, which were left without protection from the angry Arab mob that threatened to slaughter Jewish residents. Due to the riots in the mixed cities, about three Jews were murdered. Then, the big show from the Gaza Strip. First, the number of rocket launches that caused the Iron Dome defense systems to run out of interceptor missiles, and then long-range launches that expressed technological development achieved by Hamas, as they tried new types of weapons. Additionally, Hamas in Gaza coordinated the attack on Israel with Hezbollah in Lebanon until the operation Hamas chose was shaped into a perfect melody in which Israel was left with no means of defense and was attacked from the south and the north. Israel did not act against Lebanon for the attacks against it.
In practice, Israel went down on its knees and signed a ceasefire agreement after 11 days during which over 4,900 rockets were fired. But in the imaginary world, IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the public about hitting terror tunnels, about a deterred Hamas, and more. These were lies and deception.
In general, those who lie to the public about the coronavirus just to gain control over the public and instill deep fears in it, and ignore the voices of scientists who think differently, will find themselves lying to the public about its national security and preventing female soldiers serving as observers from warning the senior echelon about Hamas preparing for war.
It was the Chief of Staff, one of the worst in the history of the army, Aviv Kochavi, who presented the army's achievements: "Hamas may have initiated the firing, but immediately became reactive and pursued. The balance of achievements ended with a clear advantage to the IDF, and Hamas, which opened the war as the defender of Jerusalem, supposedly, ended it as the destroyer of the Gaza Strip."
Two years after that operation, looking back inside the Gaza Strip, correspondent Tal Lev-Ram from "Maariv" newspaper looked at the huge tunnel dug near the Erez Crossing, while feeling deceived by the people he worked with in the IDF:
"The feelings with which I left the tour of the huge Hamas tunnel discovered in northern Gaza are mixed. On the one hand, unlike in the past, this time IDF fighters are 'touching' the excavations with their hands and really damaging Hamas infrastructure. On the other hand, it is a painful reminder of the sin of arrogance of Operation 'Guardian of the Walls' in 2021." He further adds, "It's hard to understand this huge Hamas project, which was discovered at a distance of just 300-400 meters from the Erez Crossing and from the large wall that separates northern Gaza and the agricultural areas of Moshav Netiv HaAsara... Alongside the achievement in exposing the tunnel and its expected destruction, one cannot ignore the big questions that remain from Operation Guardian of the Walls and the exaggerated achievements presented to the public. Even on day 72 of the war, the findings of the underground city of Gaza that continue to be discovered in many areas in the northern Strip, stunned the army: the scope, quality, and operation. There is no trace of the targeting of the metro in Guardian of the Walls, and a big question remains as to how they assessed then, and even many months after the operation, on what basis the IDF based the extent of damage caused to Hamas's tunnel project."
Military correspondent Tal Lev-Ram admitted that the IDF lied to the public.
But not only in the military aspect did Israel lie to itself, but also in its economic support of Gaza. The perception was that if Gaza felt a sense of wealth, they would have something to lose, and therefore, Hamas's incentive to fight would decrease. This might work if alongside economic prosperity, education for peace is integrated and the form of government is not religiously extreme, preaching the murder of Jews. Israel chose to ignore the element of poisoning the minds of young generations and allowed Hamas to nurture a society that supports the extermination of Jews in the land of Israel, as part of a global struggle against Western values.
Israeli governments allowed Hamas over the years, including during the current war, to enrich itself and collect taxes from trade with Israel. Israel made Gaza residents completely dependent on Hamas due to its military and economic strengthening. Israelis did not use economic means as leverage but provided it with oxygen for years to control the population in Gaza and the West Bank, thereby expanding its control. Eyal Ofer provides many insights regarding this part of Hamas:
"In the years that Hamas has ruled the Strip, it takes money from every economic activity that takes place in the territory under its control," explains Eyal Ofer, who has researched the Gazan economy in recent years. "It does receive funds from abroad, but its economic foundation is collecting money on everything that moves. A falafel stand owner, for example, has to pay Hamas to set up his cart on the street. Money changers on the street need to pass percentages to Hamas." Unlike democratic regimes, where parliament can oppose taxes the government wants to collect, Gaza residents have no such protection mechanism.
In 2014, an article was published describing the economic mechanism:
These tax funds, alongside the taxes Hamas collected on activity in the economic tunnels—about 1,200 tunnels that operated until a year ago between Egypt and Rafah—are the explanation for the question of how Hamas managed to maintain governmental functioning while simultaneously investing capital in rocket production and building a sophisticated tunnel system, the cost of each reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars. This week it was revealed that this is a real underground city, including tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, underground tunnels beneath the Gaza Strip used in emergencies by the organization's leaders and fighters, and the attack tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Israel, which this week aroused fear among kibbutz residents around Gaza.
In an article in the "Times of Israel" newspaper, Tani Goldstein describes the absurd situation in which the Israeli government allows Hamas to launder money (the emphasis is not in the original text and is intended to highlight the context):
The Bank of Israel exchanged used shekels for new ones for banks in the Gaza Strip—and indirectly, through them, also for the Hamas government—since Hamas took control of the Strip until the massacre on October 7, 2023, claims Palestinian economy researcher Eyal Ofer. The Bank of Israel does not deny this.
Eyal Ofer explained to "Times of Israel": "The main currency in use in Gaza was and remains the shekel. Shekels deteriorate quickly there. Banks operating in Gaza—or operated there until the war—including 'Bank of Palestine,' 'Cairo-Amman Bank,' 'Islamic Bank of Palestine' and others, regularly exchanged worn shekels for new ones at the Bank of Israel. "There are dozens (over 50, perhaps even over 100) of 'changes' and money changers in Gaza. They are the arm connecting Hamas with everything else, including the legal banking system in the Strip. Where did the Gazan who received foreign money go to convert it to shekels? To all those money changers, who always have them.
"It is likely that this is Hamas's working capital: the organization collects funds, and its money changers provide citizens with cash in exchange for a bank transfer to the (legal) account of the money changer... The fact that Israel did not treat Hamas-ruled Gaza as an independent enemy state, but provided it with services out of the illusion that this would bring control that would prevent attacks."
Throughout history, enemies have fought each other by cutting off economic oxygen, but in the Israeli case, the Israeli governments provided tremendous oxygen including electricity, water, infrastructure, extensive trade, food, and new cash notes. The deadly combination of non-deep discussions in governments with a momentum of enormous economic trade provided a platform for the terrorist organization Hamas to build itself into a monster as expressed in October 2023. The responsibility is primarily on Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has been leading and managing Israel since 2009. As time passed, his actions to weaken discussions and enrich them by presenting alternatives worked against Israel. One can see the dynamics between him and the Defense Ministers he appointed over the years and the way this relationship deteriorated. The way in which senior decision-makers are appointed ultimately becomes part of a circle of yes-men. This is how a conception is built that may eventually collapse.
Currently, there is no one challenging or working to deepen governmental discussions at the political level, and ultimately everything begins and ends with Netanyahu. The responsibility for the conception that built Hamas is primarily his.
On the concept of responsibility, Prime Minister Netanyahu said when he served as Opposition Leader the following to Prime Minister Olmert against the background of Israel's failure in the Second Lebanon War:
"Those responsible for the failure, according to the committee, are the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of Staff. If there is meaning to the concept of responsibility, the Prime Minister must also go. When the failure in the war is so broad, so fundamental, when parts of the country are subject to missile fire every day, the necessary step required is the replacement of the Prime Minister who failed... If there is meaning to the concept of responsibility, the Prime Minister must also go. If there is no meaning to the concept of responsibility, Dan Halutz and Amir Peretz should be immediately returned to their positions. In refusing to vacate his position, the Prime Minister is escaping responsibility... Such a rolling of responsibility I have never seen in my days. Responsibility is not talking about responsibility. Responsibility is bearing responsibility. When the failure in the war is so broad, so fundamental, when parts of the country are subject to missile fire every day, the necessary step required is the replacement of the Prime Minister who failed."
If Netanyahu said this about others, he probably understands deep inside how much the responsibility for the Israeli crisis is exclusively his and how he will be remembered in Israeli history. After all, he is not just another commentator on reality but the man with the responsibility and the conception.
Civilization faces twin threats:
the Left, a religion disguised as an ideology;
and Islam, an ideology disguised as a religion
If not for the knowledge gained the last few years here in the US about the government's abandonment of its prime duties/responsibilities to the citizens, I would never believe the described Israeli government and military failures to protect and defend its people. I hope that Israelis can assume control of their government and military, and institute reforms, to prevent more senseless murders at the hands of blood thirsty Muslim barbarians. Right now Netanyahu, the cabinet, the military and security services must absolutely obliterate Hamas and their "palestinian" citizens. Gaza itself needs to be leveled, along with all underground tunnels. Israel then should annex Gaza which is, in reality, Israel's land. Israeli citizens deserve this little piece of mind and security.